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"COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY" DOCTRINE

into consideration in weighing these justifications."
The Supreme Court then would go one step further than Judge
Winter's interpretation of Palmer. Not only would it allow motivational
factors to be considered once a prima facie case has been established,
but it would shift the burden of persuasion to the party responsible for
the challenged activity. In Holt a prima facie case of unconstitutional
effect had been made with the proof of the timing of the dilution of black
votes. The City of Richmond should then have been forced to justify its
actions, and motivational factors should have been considered in determining whether the city has met its burden of proof.
The Court formulated the Emporia analytical rules in a fourteenth
amendment school desegregation decision. It should logically apply
them to the fifteenth amendment voting rights problem in Holt. Motivation is perhaps even more relevant to fifteenth amendment problems
where numerical comparisons of equality are not possible as they are
in fourteenth amendment questions. In the meantime, the Holt court
seems to have seized on a hybrid rule of law to avoid rectifying a subtle
infringement on rights guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment. In any
event, the court in its Holt decision has perpetrated the injustice done
by the Richmond annexation and has further confused the issue of when
legislative motivation may be considered by the court in determining the
existence of a violation of the fifteenth amendment.
ALLEN

H.

OLSON

Constitutional Law-The First Amendment and Advertising: The Effect
of the "Commercial Activity" Doctrine on Media Regulation
Mitchell Family Planning,Inc. v. City of Royal Oak' presented the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with
a novel first amendment issue framed in the context of media regulation.
Plaintiff Mitchell Family Planning, Inc., a non-profit 2 corporation, was
6
Id. at 2205. Emporia had had since 1967 to establish its own school system. It began to show
interest in doing so only after the county system was ordered to integrate. The effect of the city's
withdrawal from the county system would have been to increase the number of white students in
city schools and decrease their numbers in the county schools.

'335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
While the non-profit nature of plaintiff corporation was accepted here, in S.P.S. Consultants,
Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), plaintiff Martin S. Mitchell was identified
as president of Mitchell Referral Service, Inc., a profit-making enterprise engaged in the referral
of pregnant out-of-state women to New York physicians for the purpose of abortion procurement.
2
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engaged in the dissemination of information concerning family planning, contraception, sterilization and abortion. Mitchell leased an outdoor billboard to display the following message: "Abortion Information. Male and Female Sterilization Information. MITCHELL FAMILY PLANNING INCORPORATED, Niagara Falls, New York.
Phone No. 716-285-9133. Local Phone No. 358-4672."1 After the sign
had been erected, the defendant city adopted an ordinance4 which proscribed willful advertising of any information concerning abortion and
further prohibited billboard owners from allowing such information on
their signs. After the city attorney informed the plaintiffs that the sign
would have to be removed to avoid imminent prosecution, the plaintiffs
sued for a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and for
a permanent injunction against its enforcement.5
The court employed the "clear and present danger" doctrine6 in
holding that the billboard did not create a clear danger of the commission of illegal abortions. The offer of information concerning abortion
over the telephone did not indicate any probability that the laws of
Michigan would be transgressed, for the court could not know the content of the message which would be given to a caller.7 Additionally, there
was no reason to suspect that an illegal abortion, if indeed that was the
3335 F. Supp. at 739.
'Section 32A. ILLEGAL ADVERTISING. Any person who willfully advertises on

a sign, in his own name or the name of another person, firm or pretended firm, association, corporation or pretended corporation, any means whatever whereby a miscarriage
or abortion may be produced or procured, or any information concerning the producing

or procuring of an abortion, or who offers his services by such advertisement to assist
in the accomplishment of any such purpose, and also any person engaged in the outdoor

advertising business who suffers or permits any such advertisement to be displayed upon
any sign owned by him or under his control, shall be guilty of a violation of this
ordinance.
335 F. Supp. at 744.

5The court concluded that the ordinance was overly broad for the following reasons: First, the
ordinance did not discriminate between legal and illegal abortions. Consequently, plaintiffs were
not only prohibited from advertising an activity which the state had a compelling interest to outlaw,

illegal abortions, but also from dispensing information concerning legal activities. This flaw in
statutory draftmanship violated the constitutional mandate of specificity and narrowness. Secondly, the court examined the breadth of the ordinance in relation to the other possible state

interest, protection against "immoral advertising." The ordinance prohibited "any information
concerning the producing or procuring of an abortion," while the Michigan "immoral advertising"
statute merely covered "means" of producing an abortion. Therefore, the ordinance prohibited
both activity which the state has the requisite compelling interest in outlawing and that in which it
does not. Id. at 741-42.
'See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
7335 F. Supp. at 742-43.
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subject of the information to be volunteered, would occur immediately.
Noting that the newly liberalized abortion laws of the state of New York
would probably be part of the information dispensed by plaintiffs, the
court held that defendant did not have the necessary compelling state

interest in an abortion committed in New York to warrant the limitation of free speech.

Upon an initial reading of the opinion, the court's reasoning appears clear and persuasive. However, the court's use of the "clear and

present danger" test is in apparent conflict with the method of resolution adopted by the Supreme Court when dealing with issues like those
presented by Mitchell.
Not all speech is protected by the first amendment. 8 The Supreme
Court unequivocally identified commercial advertising as one of those

unprotected classes of speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.9 The purely
commercial nature of the message distinguished Valentine from earlier

cases which had held that protected activities included pamphleting,

°

handbilling to advertise a political rally at which admission was

charged," and picketing.' 2 This commercial exception to first amendment coverage has been described as a "general negative attitude towards commercial speech which was . . . formulated with a limited

amount of reasoned analysis.'

3

A variety of difficulties have surfaced as the Court has attempted

to deal with the cases which have arisen concerning the scope of the

"commercial activity" exception. It is important to note that the initial

approval of the regulation of commercial speech in Valentine involved
the manner of distribution and not the substance of the communica-

tion." However, judicial confusion sometimes reigned in the wake of
'Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
9316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971): "The Court
[in Valentine] felt that commercial advertising was merely ancillary to the proper performance of
a business, and accordingly could be regulated by legislative action in the public interest. Thus...
the Court effectively read commercial speech out of the first amendment." Compare the favorable
arguments in Professor Redish's article with the policy reasons for not extending first amendment
protection to purely commercial speech. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1965).
'0Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
"Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
12Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.88 (1939).
13Redish, supra note 8, at 472.
"The controversy in Valentine was precipitated by plaintiff's transportation of his submarine
to New York for a commercial exhibition. The New York City Police informed him of § 318 of
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Valentine so that occasionally courts would regulate purely commercial
speech distributed in an unobjectionable manner and non-commercial
speech which would otherwise be protected but for its dissemination for
a profit-making purpose.15 After Valentine, the Court had to clarify its
seemingly contradictory position between cases involving purely commercial speech"6 and those in which the speech merely had commercial
6 in which
overtones.' 7 The first of these was Murdock v. Pennsylvania,"
Jehovah's Witnesses were restrained from distributing their religious
materials. The Court dismissed the state's contention that because donations were sought in return for the pamphlets, the Jehovah's Witnesses' conduct was removed from the area of protected speech. Two
subsequent cases, Thomas v. Collins1" and Follett v. McCormick,"0 reaffirmed the Murdock decision by holding that the distribution of communicative material does not necessarily fall outside of the zone of protected speech merely because money is procured by the solicitor.
The degree of commercial nature the advertising must have in order
to fall within the "commercial activity" exception is unspecified. In
1951 the Court addressed the unresolved conflict between Valentine and
the Lovell-Murdock-Thomas line of cases. In Breard v. Alexandria,"'
the defendant was arrested for violating an ordinance which prohibited
door-to-door solicitation on private property for sales purposes without
prior invitation. While agreeing that the selling of the periodicals did
not put them beyond the first amendment's protection, the Court conthe Sanitary Code which forbade distribution of business advertising in the streets. Police Commissioner Valentine told Chrestensen that handbills solely devoted to "information or a public protest"
could be dispensed lawfully. Plaintiff had a double-faced handbill printed with his advertisement
on one side and a protest against city policy on the other. Disregarding defendant's warning,

plaintiff distributed his handbills and was restrained. The Supreme Court reversed the decision
granting injunctive relief to plaintiff. 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see Kaufman, The Medium, the Message
and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L.

REV.

761, 763-64 (1970). See also Redish, supra note 8,

at 458.
"See Redish, supra note 8, at 472: "The summary dismissal of the value of commercial speech
has reached into areas of traditionally protected communication. Thus the courts have often
confused pure commercial speech with the classical expression of ideas and information when the
dissemination is for profit-making purposes .

. .

. [or] on the basis of the use of the advertising

form."
"E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
"E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbilling to advertise a political rally at
which admission was charged held protected).
"9319 U.S. 105 (1943).
"323 U.S. 516 (1945).
-0321 U.S. 573 (1944).
21341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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cluded that it brought a commercial feature into the transaction. 22 With

this commercial feature thus cited as a major consideration, the Court
balanced the interests of the defendant and Alexandria's residents and
held that the latters' "desire for privacy" was of greater significance.2

The Court resolved the issue in Breard by reasserting the primary
purpose test, obliquely enunciated in Valentine,24 to establish whether

the commercial activity exception applied. The primary purpose test
examines the motive of the advertiser to discover if his reason for adver-

tising was primarily economic or whether the commercial nature of the
medium was subordinate to the dissemination of constitutionally protected expression? The primary purpose test has fallen into disuse since

the Valentine and Breard decisions.2" Now the nature of the material
and the method of communication are relevant criteria.

7

The status of the commercial activity exception has been thoroughly altered by these recent developments. Instead of automatically

removing commercial messages from the category of speech protected
by the first amendment, the doctrine now serves as an adjunct to the
12d. at 642.
at 644.
"We need not indulge nice appraisals based upon subtle distinctions in the present instance
....
It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the
affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and
for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance." 316 U.S. at 55. See also Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1944).
2The primary purpose test can be used to resolve the apparent contradictions between the
Valentine-type cases and those in the Lovell-Murdock-Thomas line of decisions. The primary
purpose test must be applied to the content of the material being distributed and the nature of the
organization sponsoring the canvassing. The availability of alternative means of dissemination
provides an analytical tool which measures the full effect of the disputed regulation on the speaker's
ability to communicate. See Note, 78 HARV. L. REv., supra note 8, at 1202-03.
"See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a libel action in which the Court
rejected plaintiffs contention that defendant's message was not protected by the first amendment
because it was a paid commercial advertisement); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (concluding that it is of no consequence that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (rejecting the contention that "motion pictures
do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit," id. at 501). See also Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (expanding the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule to
cover matters of "public or general concern"); Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn, 387 U.S. 239 (1967)
(per curiam) (broadening the scope of the Times rule to include "public figures"); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (including newsworthy items within the aegis of the Times rule).
2ln Mitchell, the commercial nature of the transactions coupled with the use of billboard
display, usually an instrumentality of business advertising, justify the application of the "commercial activity" doctrine.
223d.
4
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balancing test28 utilized by the Court 29 to determine the extent of constitutional protection in a specific controversy. The commercial nature of
a message and the chosen medium reduces the weight assigned to the
individual and social interest in its free expression. This weight is balanced against the public interest in the regulation. The balancing test
can only be employed as an analytical tool when the governmental
control of speech is0 directed at the medium of communication and not
3
the message itself.
Before progressing to an examination of the potential consequences
of an application of the balancing test to the considerations present in
Mitchell, it is necessary to illustrate the possible conflict with the analytical methodology of the Supreme Court incurred by the use of the "clear
and present danger" test by the Mitchell court. Although the "clear and
present" doctrine is a type of balancing test, 31 it is not applicable to
the situation presented in Mitchell. The "clear and present danger" test
is administered only when the statute in question attempts to limit
directly the content and not just the method of speech.32 What the
speaker says must present the danger of causing a substantive evil which
the legislature has a compelling interest in preventing. The manner is
relevant only in determining if the danger is indeed "imminent" and
"likely to incite or produce such action. '33 When the balancing test is
employed, the clear and convincing state interest which must support
media regulation is balanced against the speaker's interest in adopting
that particular method of communication. 34 If the regulation meets this
2'Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
Professor Emerson, a critic of the balancing formula, has defined it: "The formula is that the court

must, in each case, balance the individual and social interest in freedom of expression against the
social interest sought by the regulation which restricts expression." Id. at 912.
2
But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Black
strongly opposed the balancing test which he described as a "Constitution-ignoring-and-destroying
technique." Id. at 399.
"See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment." 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 216.
3'Loewy, Free Speech: The "'MissingLink" in the Law of Obscenity, 16 J. Pun. L. 81, 83
(1967).

32The stringent restraints on governmental control of freedom of speech do not ipso .facto
apply to media regulation. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1964) ("[tlhe examples are

many of the application by this Court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with
speech may be regulated or prohibited"); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).

"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262 (1941); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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test, it is constitutional even if the restricted speech presented no clear

and present danger of any further substantive evil.
The method of distribution of ideas is balanced with the state's

interest in regulating the manner of dissemination. 5 The vestigal concept of the primary purpose test, availability of alternative means of

communication, is still useful in assessing the protected status of a
particular method of dissemination.3 6 The commercial nature of either
the content or method of a particular message will have the effect of

reducing the emphasis placed on the chosen mode of communication if
there are other more reasonable means available.

Thus the commercial nature of the message involved in Mitchell
could have the effect of balancing the scales of constitutionality on the

side of regulation. If that is indeed the case, it is necessary to examine
the scope of permissible regulation and the competing interests to deter-

mine whether the ordinance in Mitchell was constitutionally infirm.37
Four general rules limit the extent to which government may regulate
media use: (1) the interest of the state in its regulatory effort must be

at least substantial;" (2) the regulation cannot be designed to restrain

content; 9 (3) any "incidental" regulation of speech must be limited to

the smallest scope possible consistent with the purpose of the restraint;40
and (4) the restriction must be so narrowly constructed as to prevent

unequal application.4
One of the first examples of media-use regulation was Kovacs v.

Cooper." There the Court sustained an ordinance prohibiting the use
of vehicles and equipment which emitted "loud and raucous" noises. 3
"5See Kaufman, supra note 13, at 771.
3
1Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
wSee Kaufman, supra note 13, at 765.
"NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958). In addition, see Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("paramount"); id. at 408 ("strong"); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("compelling"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)
("cogent", "subordinating"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that
all of the above mentioned words are synonymous with "substantial").
3
An important distinction, which is extremely material to the case under consideration, must
be noted here. Banning certain types of content entirely from one type of medium is not equivalent
to restraint of that message. Only if the ordinance in question attempted to ban all speech dealing
with abortion procurement would it violate the prohibition on content restraint. See Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
"Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967).
42336 U.S. 77 (1949).
13 1d. at 78. But cf. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). The difference in results in these
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The serenity and privacy of the neighborhoods in which the sound trucks
ventured was deemed to be of greater importance than the use of the
loudspeaker systems as a medium. In Banzhaf v. FCC44 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the cigarette advertising regulation adopted
by the FCC requiring a health warning in all broadcast cigarette commercials was not violative of the first amendment. The court cited
Valentine and many of its successors in support of its statement that
"product advertising is at least less rigorously protected than other
forms of speech." 4 The regulation was upheld as being properly narrow46 and adequately supported by the compelling state interest in public
health," so that the incidental and minor "chilling effect" on the broadcasters which might result was deemed to be "overbalanced." 4
Three years later in CapitalBroadcastingCo. v. Mitchell," a threejudge panel denied injunctive relief against the enforcement of section
6 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. 0 Also denied
was a declaratory judgment holding section 6 unconstitutional. The
court noted that strong governmental and public interest in public health
was the basis of the regulation, 51 and that the petitioners were not prohibited from publicizing information about cigarettes. They merely lost
the privilege of collecting revenue from broadcasting tobacco manufacturers' messages.
There is little question that billboards as an advertising medium
itself can be regulated with respect to size and height. 3 A state law, 4
banning most roadside signs and all purely commercial advertisements
from interstate highways,55 withstood a first amendment attack in
two cases is due to contrary resolution of the issue of vagueness. See text accompanying note 40
supra.
"405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"ld. at I101.
"Id.
11Id. at 1096-97.
1Id. at 1101-02.
"1333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affdsub nora. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 92
S. Ct. 1289 (1972).
-15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
51333 F. Supp. at 583-84.
111d. at 584.
OE.g., State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
"Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§47.42.010-.910
(1970), and the Regulations adopted thereunder by the Highway Commission on May 18, 1961, 3
WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 252-40, cited in Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,
408, 439 P.2d 248, 251 (1968).
"Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.42.020(b) (1970)
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Markham Advertising Co. v. State. 6 The court observed the secondary
position of purely commercial speech in the constitutional heirarchy,57
citing Valentine. It gave sympathetic consideration to the public interest
in prohibiting the "dangerous, obtrusive, and unsolicited presence of
advertising structures,"58 as well as the public interest n citizens' comfort and convenience on the basis of Kovacs v. Cooper.55
These examples of permissible regulation of media portend the
necessity of examining the possible state or public interests which could
support a contrary ruling in Mitchell,
The first public interest that could justify the ordinance involves a
combination of public health and morality. 1 However, the nexus between these social needs and the regulation is quite tenuous.12 Additionally, the state's interest in enforcing morality may not be compelling
since the first amendment's penumbra protects privacy of certain sexual
activity from governmental intrusion. 3 The second public interest justification that can be proposed is protection of the fetus. This issue was
decided in cases in which the constitutionality of abortion statutes was
challenged. In Babbitz v. McCann,64 the district court held the statute65
unconstitutional, striking a balance in favor of a woman's right to refuse
(no sign not specifically exempt could be placed within 660 feet of the right-of-way of interstate
system highways).
5173 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1948), appealdismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (per curiam).
5
11d. at 428, 439 P.2d at 262.

"Id.
111d. at 429, 439 P.2d at 263.
"0 The goal and the duty of such an investigation was stated in Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943): "In considering legislation which thus limits the dissemination of knowledge, we must 'be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must 'weigh the
circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation.'"
"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719
(1962) (upholding ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956) which prohibited advertising to produce
abortion or prevent conception). The public interest served by the statute, either moral consideratins or the venereal disease problem, was held substantial and predominant when compared with
the private interest in free speech through advertising.
"Trhe widespread availability of a variety of inexpensive contraceptive devices as well as the
almost universal familiarity with these methods undermines the credibility of the assertion that the
dissemination of information concerning expensive and painful abortions will materially reduce the
incidence of venereal disease or promiscuity.
OGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
61310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1(1970); accord, e.g. Roe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970),jurisdictionalissue postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971),
scheduledfor reargument,92 S.Ct. 2476 (1972).
5
" WIs. STAT. ANN., §§940.04(1), (5) (1958).
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to carry an embryo during the early months of pregnancy. This right
may not be restricted by the state without a more compelling public
necessity than protection of the embryo. 6 The United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina in Corkey v.
Edwards," however, arrived at a diametrically opposed conclusion. The
contention that the state has a cogent interest both in protecting public

health by controlling the venereal disease epidemic and in preserving the
life of a fetus is not relevant, regardless of the final resolution of the
controversy aired in Babbitz and Corkey, because there are other direct
criminal sanctions by which the state can assert these interests without
venturing into the first amendment area.
The final public interest which could justify the regulation is a
mixture of highway safety and aesthetics. This was the basis for the
restrictions in Markham Advertising Co. v. State.68 It is quite conceivable that the very word "abortion" would be shocking or at least disconcerting to a segment of the motoring public." The dangerous conse11310 F. Supp. at 301.
67322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Judicial acceptance of the position asserted by the
plaintiffs in this class action, that the state has no substantial interest in interfering with a woman's
right to choose between childbirth and abortion, was held to involve a value judgment beyond the
proper capacity of the court. Id. at 1250. The evaluative process which the court refused to
undertake was deemed to be within the province of the legislature. Id. Finally, the North Carolina
General Assembly's determination that protection of the embryo was an adequate public interest
to support the statutory invasion of a woman's protected zone of privacy was approved as a valid
exercise of the legislative function. Id. at 1254. Accord, e.g. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ohio 1970).
073 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); see text accompanying note 75 infra.
6
But cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing a conviction for disturbing the
peace by offensive conduct based on defendant's wearing a jacket on which was inscribed "Fuck
the Draft" while he was walking along a corridor of a county courthouse). This case can easily be
distinguished from Mitchell because of the different state interests advanced as justification for
the two ordinances. In Cohen, the Court held that neither the interest in prohibiting speech that
would incite violent reaction nor that of protecting public morality would suffice as a compelling
rationale for the application of the ordinance to the actions of the defendant. Id. at 20-21. As only
this particular enforcement of the ordinance was deemed violative of constitutional rights, the
setting in which the protected activity transpired becomes all important. Cohen was walking in a
corridor. He was surrounded by persons walking or sitting. Someone disturbed by the content of
his message could easily avert his or her eyes. Id. at 21. And even if some person were so upset by
the word "Fuck" that he or she became physically disoriented, the worst that could happen would
be a minor collision with another pedestrian or a wall. The extremely limited adverse consequences
of being upset by Cohen's message is completely different from the possibilities inherent in the
Mitchell situation. The driver who's sensibilities are assaulted by the sight of the word "abortion"
on the billboard could easily cause a serious accident involving major property damage, physical
injury or death, if the shock was serious enough to destroy his or her concentration on the highway
and traffic. The interest of the state in preventing this type of consequence is more compelling than
that present in Cohen.
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quences of such an effect are obvious when one considers the inherent
dangers of high speed automobile travel and the omnipresent nature of
billboard advertising which is seen without the exercise of choice or
volition.
The Supreme Court decision in Railway Express, Inc. v. New

York 0 lends support to the contention that highway safety is a compelling state interest which legitimates the ordinance questioned in
Mitchell. Although appellant did not raise the first amendment issue71
and instead relied upon the due process and equal protection clauses in
attacking the constitutionality of a New York City traffic regulation
which forbade the operation of any advertising vehicle, except those
engaged in normal business which carried the commercial message of
the owner, 72 the conclusion of the Court of Special Sessions 73 that the
prohibited advertising on the side of defendant's trucks constituted a
distraction and safety hazard to pedestrians and motorists was accepted
by the Court.74
Applying the principles and criteria previously discussed, a persuasive case can be made that the Mitchell decision is not in harmony with
the probable resolution of the issues indicated by prior adjudication.
First, the "commercial activity" doctrine applies to Mitchell. The billboard advertised information, but the actual service to be provided was
75
referral to New York physicians as observed in the court's "inference."
This introduced "into the transaction a commercial feature. ' 70 Also, the
medium Mitchell employed to communicate his information was commercial in nature.77 Second, the balancing test as affected by the "commercial activity" doctrine, employed in lieu of the court's questionable
application of the "clear and present danger" test, could easily be resolved in favor of the state. Mitchell's right was to disseminate his
information. This must be balanced against the public ifiterest in highway safety which is strong and compelling and has been cited as suffi70336 U.S. 106 (1949).
"Presumably on account of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
72336 U.S. at 107-08.
73People v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 188 Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1947), affd, 297
N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13 (1947), affd sub nom. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949).
7"336 U.S. at 109. See also Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911) (sustaining
the predecessor ordinance against due process and equal protection attacks); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 168, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935).
5335 F. Supp. at 743. See also note 2 supra.
7"Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
"See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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cient justification for prohibiting almost all roadway advertising." In
Mitchell there is the added factor of shock to some drivers caused by
the word "abortion."
The Mitchell court's objection to the breadth of the regulation was
also debatable. Instead of judging the ordinance by the type of abortion
information proscribed,79 the court should have noted that the only
medium regulated was the billboard. This introduces the final consideration which demonstrates the probable constitutionality of the ordinance.
As billboard advertising was the only medium the plaintiff was prohibited from using, he had many alternative means of communicating his
information. The newspaper appears to be the most suitable, although
radio and television are plausible. Mr. Mitchell might even be able to
follow in the illustrious, and apparently immortal, footsteps of F.J.
Chrestensen and disseminate his message by handbill.
JOHN MICHAEL

KoPs

Consumer Protection-Truth-In-Lending Disclosures Not Timely at
Closing
Recognizing that the American consumer was faced with inconsistent and noncomparable credit disclosure practices which were causing
confusion about credit,' Congress enacted Title I (Truth in Lending) of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the Act),2 which became effective
July 1, 1969. 3 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(the Board) was granted the power of prescribing regulations4 for the
Act. The implementing regulation, known as Regulation Z,5 became
7

See Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 415-16, 439 P.2d 248, 254-55

(1968) (summary of expert testimony concerning the effect of billboards on highway safety).
79335 F. Supp. at 741-42.
IS. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1967).
'Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-81 (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 504(b), 82 Stat. 167.
'Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970):
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions,
and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as
in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this
subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.
512 C.F.R. § 226 (1971).

